dumping authorities systematically disfavor export interests, on matters of both substance and procedure, reinforces the liberal trader's instinct to cheer on WTO panels and the Appellate Body as they find national anti-dumping measures inconsistent with the requirements of the Anti-Dumping Agreement negotiated during the Uruguay Round. 2 This paper suggests that such an instinct is at least partially misguided. The decidedly unsympathetic attitude of panels and the Appellate Body towards national anti-dumping actions is not costless for those favoring more liberal trade. Anti-dumping dispute settlement arises in the context of a special standard of review, inserted at the behest of the United States, which calls for some greater measure of deference to national anti-dumping authorities than is required in other WTO reviews of national actions that restrict trade. The failure of the WTO process to show that deference, or even to do a good job at disguising its lack of deference, has led United States officials to conclude that they have not obtained the protections for which their predecessors negotiated. While the static effects of this pattern of WTO decisions may be beneficial for increasing trade flows, the dynamic effects may well be less benign, as the United States adjusts its negotiating strategy to take account of this institutional usurpation of the negotiation results.
The paper proceeds by first reviewing, in somewhat summary fashion, the WTO's record of anti-dumping decisions. It then shows how, at least in theory, the differences between domestic and international "litigation" may make these liberal trade victories somewhat pyrrhic by limiting later opportunities for trade liberalizing negotiations. Finally, it offers a preliminary look at the actual responses of relevant actors to see if there is evidence that the theoretical negative effects on liberal trade are being realized in practice.
II. WTO Review of Anti-Dumping Actions: The Record
From the effective date of the WTO agreements on January 1, 1995 through April 30, 2003 , the WTO dispute settlement process rendered decisions on twelve anti-dumping measures imposed by national authorities.
3 At present there is one active panel reviewing a U.S. anti-dumping measure. 4 There are also sixteen pending consultations, 5 some of which will likely result in the formations of dispute settlement panels. Some consultations, however, have been technically active for some years without moving to either a dispute settlement panel or a satisfactory resolution.
Exporting countries challenging anti-dumping measures have prevailed on at least one significant issue in each of the twelve cases decided to date. Accordingly, either revocation or modification of the anti-dumping measures has been required. Generally speaking, the losing countries have complied with final decisions, though sometimes not without the need for further dispute settlement under 21.5 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. 6 Not surprisingly, compliance has not yet been achieved in the four cases decided in the last six months. Of the previous eight cases, the required revocation or modification of anti-dumping orders appears to have been effected in five cases. In two others, both involving findings 3 Because of appeals, implementation disputes, and the re-filing of one dispute, there are twenty-two panel and Appellate Body reports on these twelve cases. 4 United States -Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan, WT/DS244 (panel established May 22, 2002) . 5 World Trade Organization (2003) . 6 Article 21.5 provides for further dispute settlement proceedings in the event of disagreements over whether a losing party has adequately complied with prior adopted decisions of panels or the Appellate Body.
against the United States, compliance has not been achieved. 7 WTO reports on the eighth case are ambiguous as to whether compliance satisfactory to the complaining country was achieved.
One should obviously not draw from these statistics any strong conclusions about WTO review of anti-dumping actions. The universe of cases is still a small one. The unbroken string of successes for complaining countries might have an explanation other than the imposition of the policy preferences of the dispute settlement bodies. It is possible, for example, that only the most egregious cases are pursued through the dispute settlement process by exporting countries, making it likely that complainants will prevail. Similarly, however, one cannot draw from other raw statistics the conclusion that the WTO process has been appropriately deferential to national authorities. For example, the simple fact that relatively few national anti-dumping determinations are challenged in the WTO proves very little about the WTO process. 8 It may be that most exporters find their most efficient response to a dumping measure to be moderate price adjustments that eliminate the dumping margin, rather than pursuit of an appeal. Likewise, the fact that about as many individual claims within challenges are rejected as are upheld is not particularly probative of anything. An exporting country challenging a national determination need only prevail on one significant issue to achieve a substantial victory.
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To move beyond the unrevealing statistics cited by lawyers for both exporters and import-sensitive industries, I examined in a prior paper the decisions of the panels and the Appellate Body. That paper was an effort to evaluate how the WTO dispute settlement bodies 7 Congressional action is required to comply with the finding in United States -Hot-Rolled Steel from Japan, DS/184. 8 The suggestion that the small number of appeals vindicates the WTO process is made in Durling (2003) . 9 Consider, for example, United States -Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea, WT/DS99/R (Jan. 29, 1999) . Nine of eleven issues in that case were decided favorably to the United States. Yet the two issues on which Korea were implementing the more deferential standard of review included in the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 10 The paper focused specifically on the requirement in Article 17.6(ii) that panels uphold actions by national anti-dumping authorities that rest on a "permissible interpretation" of a provision of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 11 This provision, focused as it is on legal interpretations, provides the most useful barometer for judging how aggressive the WTO dispute settlement bodies have been in finding national anti-dumping actions inconsistent with WTO obligations. Unlike factual determinations, which rest on an often huge and only partly available record, the legal reviews of WTO dispute settlement bodies are wholly contained within the published reports of those bodies. From this analysis, I concluded that the special standard of review for legal issues has had virtually no impact on the review of anti-dumping measures by the WTO.
In many instances the WTO dispute settlement bodies found the interpretations of national authorities inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement without applying the Article 17.6(ii) standard except in the most formalistic way. Only when the interpretation offered by the national authorities was manifestly tenuous did these bodies consider, and then reject, the possibility that such alternative interpretations might be "permissible." Issues on which the dispute settlement bodies did uphold the interpretations of national authorities tended to involve strained arguments offered by the exporting country and thus reflected little in the way of deference.
prevailed were sufficiently important that the United States, in order to comply with the panel finding, revoked the dumping order. 10 Tarullo (2002) . 11 The text of Article 17.6(ii) reads, in relevant part:
[T]he panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Where the panel finds that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities' measures to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations.
One good example of the disregard of the Article 17.6(ii) standard of review is provided by the Appellate Body's treatment of the "zeroing" issue in the EC --Bed Linen case. 12 Some background on anti-dumping practice is necessary to understand the Appellate Body's decision of this issue. In determining whether a product was sold at dumped prices, anti-dumping authorities traditionally calculated a weighted average price of sales in the home market and compared that average with individual export sales to the country conducting the anti-dumping investigation. If, after making any appropriate adjustments, an export sale was found to be at a price below this weighted-average home market price, a dumping margin for that sale was calculated. If, on the other hand, an export sale was made at a price above the weighted average home market price, the margin was calculated as "zero." When, in order to calculate an overall dumping margin, the margins on all the individual sales were added and averaged (weighted for the quantity of the sales), the export prices higher than the home market price were thus not allowed to offset the export prices lower than the foreign market price. Indeed, it was possible to make a dumping finding even where the weighted average price of export sales was higher than the weighted average of home market sales. Some countries sought negotiated a change in this practice during the Uruguay Round. They obtained the obligation created by Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement:
Subject to the provision governing fair comparison in paragraph 4, the existence of margins of dumping during the investigation phase shall normally be established on the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value with a weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions or by a comparison of normal value and export prices on a transaction-to-transaction basis.
In a 1997 anti-dumping determination involving Indian exports of bed linen to the European Communities, the European Commission calculated multiple dumping margins, 7 corresponding to the different kinds of bed linen exports. The margin for each type of bed linen was calculated by comparing a weighted-average normal (i.e., home market) value with a weighted-average export price. Then the Commission added together the margins determined for each kind of bed linen in order to calculate a dumping margin for the product as a whole.
In doing so, however, the Commission treated as "zero" any margin that was negative as an arithmetic matter -i.e., where the weighted-average value of export sales of a particular kind of bed linen was greater than the weighted-average value of home market sales of that same kind of bed linen. Thus the Commission used the "zeroing" approach, albeit at a stage of the dumping calculation different from that which had given rise to the demand for change during the Uruguay Round. India, predictably, was unhappy with the result and initiated a WTO dispute settlement proceeding.
The European Communities argued that Article 2.4.2 does not answer the question whether anti-dumping authorities may "zero" out a negative margin for one model of a product in the process of combining margins for different models to determine whether the product has been dumped. Conforming to the requirements of Article 2.4.2, the Commission had dutifully compared the weighted-average home-market value to weighted-average export prices for each type of bed linen. But then, in accordance with the requirement of Article 2.1 of the AntiDumping Agreement that dumping of a product be calculated by comparing a single "price" of the exported product with a single "price" of the product in the home market, the Commission With this interpretation, the Appellate Body essentially read the word "comparable" out of Article 2.4.2 or, more precisely, rendered its presence meaningless. This in itself is contrary to the usual norm of international treaty interpretation that parties to a treaty are assumed to intend that its provisions have an effect, and thus are not to be interpreted as meaningless. The drafting history of Article 2.4.2 reinforces this point, insofar as insertion 13 Perhaps, though, we would not be quite so sympathetic if we learned that some countries had sought broader language to forbid various variations on "zeroing." Personal communications with people involved in the Uruguay Round negotiations yield, not surprisingly, a difference of views on this point. This situation is further support for the view that international instruments should generally be interpreted on the basis on the language they contain, rather than the recollections of negotiators as to what was "really" intended. 14 EC Bed Linen at ¶55. 15 Id. at ¶57.
of the word "comparable" was the only change made to this provision between publication of the Draft Final Act of the Uruguay Round negotiations and the text as adopted.
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Furthermore, the Appellate Body's invocation of a dictionary definition of "comparable" was exceedingly selective. The dictionary cited by the Appellate Body includes as additional definitions "fit to be compared" and "worth comparing." 17 These other definitions add a sense of selectivity to the concept of "comparable" that the Appellate Body overlooked in citing the almost tautological definition "able to be compared." A reading of the term in accordance with usual principles of treaty interpretation would find it to have some effect upon the meaning of the sentence. The meaning may indeed be susceptible to different interpretations, perhaps including the one favored by the Appellate Body. But the Commission's interpretation seems at least equally plausible. The Appellate Body did not even purport to consider whether there could be multiple "permissible" interpretations of the Article 2.4.2 language. Instead, it simply imposed its own preferred reading.
The most striking feature of the dispute settlement reports reviewing dumping measures is how, in each close interpretive instance, they fail to provide even a pro forma analysis of the possibility of multiple interpretations. Regular readers of Appellate Body reports will also note that, nothwithstanding that body's propensity to interpret each contested provision in sometimes excessive detail, it has never parsed the meaning of "permissible." Still, it is not my intention in this paper exhaustively to reargue the 
III. Dynamic Effects in Theory
In this part of the paper let us consider things from the perspective of someone committed to liberal trade. A policy of WTO dispute settlement activism will, at first glance, appeal to a "trade liberal" as a blow against national protectionism practiced through trade remedy laws. However, a focus on the dynamic effects of that activism complicates the picture considerably, leaving our trade liberal uncertain whether -as a theoretical matter -the net result will be more or less trade liberalization.
As earlier suggested, a trade liberal will regard the very concept of an anti-dumping law as bad policy. 21 The series of amendments to U.S. law during the 1970s and 1980s that made anti-dumping measures easier to obtain for domestic industries will further convince such a person that anti-dumping is essentially special interest legislation. Having also heard tales of arbitrary administrative practices directed against exporters in the course of 17 Thompson (1995) . 18 I am also not rearguing the question of whether Article 17.6 is a significant or modest departure from generally applicable WTO standards of review, a point also discussed in Tarullo (2002) . 19 Cunningham & Cribb (2003) ; Greenwald (2003) . 20 Durling (2003) .
anti-dumping investigations, our trade liberal will be tempted to applaud a WTO dispute settlement body reviewing national anti-dumping measures that applies the strictest possible scrutiny to the actions of the administrators and that construes the disciplines in the Anti-Dumping Agreement as broadly as possible.
Such a stance would be consistent with the view of some public choice scholars that a judge "often transforms statutes designed to benefit narrow interest groups into statutes that in fact further the public interest," 22 and that this is an appropriate role for adjudicators. including the analogy they draw to the Commerce Clause jurisprudence of the U.S.
Constitution, is consistent with strict scrutiny of anti-dumping measures, believed by many to be the ultimate example of special interest protectionist measures.
Of course, the existence and appropriateness of judicial activism are perhaps the two most contested concepts in U.S. constitutional law scholarship. What appears to some 21 I once suggested a rationale for an anti-dumping law that was more consistent with conventional economic principles. Tarullo (1986) . Whatever the merits of such a rationale, it would call for a dumping law very different from those in force in the United States, European Communities, Canada, and many other countries. 22 Macey (1986) .
observers to be a necessary "interpretation" of a statute seems to others more like judicial Strict scrutiny by WTO dispute settlement bodies would limit the protectionist effects of national anti-dumping practice. As with the "zeroing" issue in EC Bed Linen, statutes or administrative interpretations that increased dumping margins could be found to violate international obligations whenever they were inconsistent with a broad reading of Anti-Dumping Agreement requirements. Similarly, the exercise of administrative discretion so as to increase the protectionist effect of the anti-dumping laws could be held inconsistent with either specific Anti-Dumping Agreement provisions or the overall duty of "good faith" which the Appellate Body has read into all actions by WTO members. 24 The result would be the invalidation of a broader range of national anti-dumping practices.
Assuming that national authorities faithfully implemented the dispute settlement decisions and modified their practices in future cases, the overall effect would be fewer anti-dumping restrictions and thus more trade.
23 McGinnis & Movsesian (2000) . 24 In the Japan Steel case, the Appellate Body invoked the "organic principle of good faith" to prohibit national authorities "from imposing burdens on exporters which, in the circumstances, are not reasonable." Japan Steel at ¶101.
Before arriving at this conclusion, our trade liberal should note two important differences between domestic and international legal systems, which together limit the validity of the domestic analogy for international governance. First, states are the only legal actors in the WTO system. Hence the parties who "litigate" in the WTO dispute settlement system are all members of the "legislative" body that makes WTO rules. In a domestic setting, litigants are rarely legislators. A losing litigant must act through sympathetic legislators, rather than directly, in order to offset the effects of the judicial decision. Second, in practice the WTO "legislators" must agree unanimously to new rules.
Although the WTO provides a process for amendments to existing WTO agreements by supermajority vote, amendments are binding only on those members that vote for them.
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In any case, there have been no amendments of any sort to the WTO, a continuation of the situation in the later years of the GATT. Thus a losing party must wait until the next round of multilateral negotiations to seek a new rule to overturn the dispute settlement decision.
Yet new trade agreements also require unanimity, at least in the sense that no nation is bound unless it agrees to the new rules.
Far from undermining the provisional conclusion that aggressive WTO review of national anti-dumping measures will liberalize trade, these characteristics of the international trading system appear at first glance to make the case for activist review even stronger than in a domestic context. By disregarding 17.6 and interpreting broadly the disciplines in the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Appellate Body will have effectively amended that Agreement. In order to validate the practices of its anti-dumping authorities, First, with respect to the specific provisions disregarded or "rewritten" by the WTO dispute settlement bodies, countries on the losing end of the decisions decline to negotiate stronger language to achieve the aim originally intended. For example, the United States may conclude that there is no point in negotiating more specific language on the Article 17.6 standard of review, because the Appellate Body will continue to disregard the provision. Hence the U.S. will not seek such a change, even if it attaches greater value to having a 17.6 standard of review than to some of its other negotiating aims. The United of new negotiating rounds, it is virtually inconceivable that the United States or EU would be forced to withdraw from the WTO in order to avoid accepting an amendment. 26 In this discussion, references to "costs," "pay," "price," and other economic terms are meant to be understood from the perspective of the negotiating states and are, accordingly, more political than economic. So, for example, a restriction on national discretion to administer the trade laws that would look to most economists like a gain may be seen by trade negotiators as a loss because configuration of domestic political forces makes an agreement with such provisions harder to ratify.
States might have been willing to give more in concessions to other countries in exchange for such a standard than for these other aims. Countries negotiating with the United States, in turn, may have agreed to a narrow standard of review in order to obtain these U.S.
concessions, for which they will now have to "pay" more. The result is to foreclose a deal with maximum reciprocal benefits, as valued by the negotiating parties themselves.
This outcome may not greatly disturb our trade liberal, since it leaves in place the broad standard of review, which dispute settlement bodies will continue to apply so as to overturn national anti-dumping measures. The only effect is to reduce somewhat the secondary liberalizing benefits by precluding an agreement in which the losing country offers additional trade liberalizing measures to obtain the same trade-restricting opportunity which it thought it had secured in earlier negotiations. But this negotiating dynamic may extend well beyond the potential renegotiation of provisions already interpreted by the Appellate Body. Negotiating countries may generalize their observations about reviews of anti-dumping measures to conclude that the Appellate Body will tend to construe broadly all disciplines included in the Anti-dumping Agreement. The United States and other regular users of anti-dumping laws will thus expect the "costs" of additional disciplines in the Agreement to increase progressively as the WTO dispute settlement system decides cases construing these new disciplines. Other countries will have to "pay" more for these changes during trade negotiations. Yet it is quite possible that these other governments value the discipline as expected to be broadened by the dispute settlement bodies less than the additional costs which the countries that frequently use anti-dumping law anticipate bearing. Once again, the WTO negotiators will be not reach an optimal trade deal, in which each country bargains for the maximum concessions from others for the minimum "price" it has to pay. Unlike the simple example involving a provision previously construed by the Appellate Body, the dynamic costs resulting from this possibility may exceed the static liberal trade benefits of the earlier dispute settlement decisions.
There is thus a direct relationship between the practice of WTO dispute settlement bodies and the potential for sub-optimal trade negotiations. By significantly "changing"
the rules from what one or more countries believed they had previously negotiated, the Appellate Body has denied WTO members the ability to specify obligations in the way that maximizes the benefits each can obtain. Other WTO members cannot, for example, effectively offer the United States a standard of review giving a national anti-dumping authority discretion to choose its own permissible interpretation of Anti-Dumping Agreement provisions, because the United States believes the dispute settlement bodies will interpret that discretion away. 27 Any anti-dumping discipline, understood in its original negotiated formulation to have a restrictive impact on the scope for national antidumping measures that might be quantified as "n", must now be understood as having an "n-plus" restrictive impact. Countries seeking to preserve their anti-dumping discretion may assess the political costs of the marginal restrictive impact represented by the "plus" as greater than countries seeking to restrain the use of anti-dumping laws assess the benefits from that same marginal impact. If so, the dispute settlement process may have foreclosed deals that WTO member countries might have negotiated.
28 27 In terms used in analysis of domestic contract law, the Appellate Body has converted the standard of review in anti-dumping disputes from a "default" rule (to be applied in the absence of a negotiated rule) to an "immutable" rule (one that cannot be changed through negotiations) Ayres & Gertner (1989) . 28 Unlike many private contractual situations, it would be very difficult to minimize the dynamic losses by negotiating contingency clauses to reallocate contractual rights I the event of unanticipated legal interpretations. With over 130 member countries and trade agreements containing literally thousands of provisions, an effort to produce a set of contingencies would pose transactions costs that would, as a practical matter, be prohibitive.
The negative dynamic effects of WTO dispute settlement activism may be increased because WTO member countries are uncertain as to just how activist the Appellate Body will be in the future. That is, all sides are unsure as to the magnitude of the "plus" in the "n-plus" impact that a negotiated rule will have on anti-dumping enforcement. As a result, assigning a value to proposed concessions becomes even more difficult. Moreover, the unpredictability of the dispute settlement process may elicit risk-averse reactions from all the negotiating countries. The United States and other countries that are frequent users of anti-dumping laws may assume that the Appellate Body will find all national anti-dumping measures inconsistent with whatever disciplines are included in the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 29 On the other hand, countries opposed to the widespread use of anti-dumping laws may assume that the Appellate Body will, in order to limit criticism of its role, sometimes interpret these disciplines much more narrowly.
The analysis to this point reveals some unintended and, presumably, unwanted effects of WTO dispute settlement activism. WTO member countries cannot negotiate narrow disciplines on anti-dumping measures. They may value differently the additional disciplines that will be imposed through the dispute settlement process. They do not even know the eventual breadth of the disciplines they are negotiating. They may each assume the least favorable interpretive tendency from the Appellate Body. The cumulative effect of these constraints upon the negotiators may be to make future trade-liberalizing agreements harder to achieve and, even when they are achieved, less trade-liberalizing.
Other adverse consequences for trade negotiations may arise from a broad political backlash against WTO dispute settlement. The analysis to this point has tried to 29 Congressional scrutiny of trade agreement provisions provides a significant incentive for risk aversion on the part of Executive Branch negotiators.
hypothesize the rational calculus of negotiators for whom relevant factors are largely endogenous to the WTO system as a whole. Lurking in the background has been the influence of political forces that define, to a significant extent, the negotiators' assessment of the costs and benefits of trade negotiations. These forces may, in some circumstances, provide not just some discrete constraints upon negotiators, but a more generalized resistance to trade-liberalizing negotiations, based on the belief that WTO dispute settlement bodies will alter the deal after the fact. This possibility returns us to the earliermentioned distinctions between governance of the international trading system and domestic governance. The identity of "litigants" and "legislators" in the international arena means that outcomes in the dispute settlement process are more likely to be directly This feature of the international trading system points to a potential effect on trade liberalization that arises precisely because the United States is at the center of the controversy over dispute settlement decisions. The phenomena of immutable rules, uncertainty, and political backlash are theoretically applicable to all countries. Trade negotiations will be harder to achieve and, when achieved, may contain fewer liberalizing commitments than would have been the case in the absence of Appellate Body activism.
The extent of this handicap, though, may be a function of the size of the WTO members whose negotiating aims are most directly affected. A smaller country is rarely able to exert much influence on the overall shape of the negotiated agreements; it must focus on the handful of issues of specific importance to it. The completed agreement is, in essence, presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Despite the formal requirement of member consent, however, the "leave it" option may be an impractical one, since the world trading system will move forward without the small country. 30 The United States is not in such a position. There will, realistically, not be any "world" trade agreement that omits the United
States. For this reason, political controversy in the United States over dispute settlement may be said to pose a risk (if only a moderate one) to the entire Doha Round of trade negotiations.
It now seems clear that dispute settlement activism will set off a dynamic process that will foreclose some trade liberalizing measures. To the degree that this activism discourages the exchange of maximally valued concessions, there will be the international negotiating equivalent of "deadweight" losses. 31 It is impossible to quantify these losses and, prospectively at least, it is even difficult to describe them with precision. It is possible, however, to sketch out the classes of static gains and dynamic losses for liberal trade.
In static terms, the United States and other heavy users of anti-dumping laws may be "losers" as a political matter when the dispute settlement process disregards Article 17.6
and consistently overturns anti-dumping measures. Most economists, however, would conclude that total welfare should increase in both the United States and the rest of the world if fewer anti-dumping measures are imposed. The quantum of welfare gains may be relatively significant (as these things go) for countries whose important export sectors are repeatedly subject to anti-dumping measures. 32 On the other hand, welfare gains will be quite small for countries that infrequently or never use anti-dumping measures and that have few exports subject to anti-dumping measures.
In dynamic terms, it is clear that everyone loses. The questions are how great the welfare losses will be and how they will be apportioned. As to the magnitude of dynamic losses, the foregoing analysis has demonstrated several ways in which negotiations for additional trade liberalizing commitments may be adversely affected by negotiators' responses to dispute settlement activism. The central role of the United States increases the 30 Of course, strength may lie in numbers. If a significant number of smaller countries agree on key issues, they may affect the negotiations significantly. The Cairns Group of smaller agricultural exporting countries ("smaller" in terms of GDP, not geography) is one such example. 31 Again, the economic terms used in this discussion are analogies only. The deadweight "loss" referred to in the text is calculated based on the hypothetical valuations of various possible negotiating concessions. This is not deadweight economic loss. However, if one assumes that most concessions offered during trade negotiations are efficiency-enhancing (a contestable proposition but one many economists would embrace), then the foreclosure of specific trade deals as described in the text is roughly congruent with deadweight loss in an economic sense.
chances that global dynamic losses will be significant. The perceived disregard of Article 17.6, particularly in the context of a perception of general Appellate Body hostility towards trade remedy laws, can be expected to raise substantially the anticipated political costs of additional trade remedy law disciplines. The result would be fewer reciprocal trade liberalizing measures. If the political backlash is strong enough, the entire scope and speed of the Doha Round may be adversely affected. As to the apportionment of welfare losses arising from the lost negotiating opportunities, it is by no means assured that the significant dynamic losers will be the same countries that are the significant static gainers. The counterfactual nature of an analysis of dynamic negotiating losses makes it particularly slippery, to be sure. Still, one can certainly imagine a scenario in which discrete liberalizing rules unrelated to anti-dumping that are of particular interest to certain developing countries will be foreclosed because the United States fears the breadth the new rules may acquire in the dispute settlement process.
The disregard of Article 17.6 may have started with the best of intentions. That standard of review can plausibly be read as a special interest insert into a system that should, from a trade liberal's perspective, be limiting special interest protectionism. Since administrators can devise any number of ways to make affirmative findings of dumping, even where the Anti-Dumping agreement forecloses some methods, the "judicial" bodies of the WTO might reasonably have conceived their role as extending discipline to these variations. But the institutional nature of the trading system and the dominance of the United States limit the analogy to domestic judicial oversight. The static gains to trade arising from activist dispute settlement may not outweigh the dynamic losses for many 32 Even this prospective gain must be qualified: Even if an anti-dumping measure is found inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement and eventually modified, the trade disrupting effects of an anti-dumping countries. Depending on the strength of the political backlash, the very process of trade liberalization could be threatened. The hidden costs of activist review of national administration of trade laws look potentially significant, at least as a theoretical matter.
IV. Dynamic Effects in Practice
Our trade liberal should by now be having serious second thoughts about dispute settlement activism. Yet empirical evaluation of the impact of WTO dispute settlement on the negotiating strategy and calculus of member states will be at best imprecise and at worst speculative. Following the old maxim that particularly values a bird in the hand, our trade liberal might yet be tempted to cheer for dispute settlement activism. Before succumbing to this temptation, the committed trade liberal must remind herself that even effects which are hard to predict may materially influence strategies and outcomes. Let us turn, accordingly, to the limited evidence available on the impact of anti-dumping dispute outcomes on trade liberalization.
A credible assessment will concentrate on trade negotiations, since here is where the theoretical analysis hypothesizes the most tangible effects. At present, the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations is languishing, so there is not even a full case study to examine for evidence of the impact of aggressive review of anti-dumping measures on negotiating behavior. Accordingly, we must limit ourselves to the most tentative of indications that the decisions of the dispute settlement bodies have had an effect, particularly on the United States. Three observations are pertinent. Fourth, it is essential that dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body, in interpreting obligations related to trade remedy laws, follow the appropriate standard of review and do not impose on national authorities obligations that are not contained in the Agreements.
There is some ambiguity as to whether this principle is also a proposal for additional negotiations, or whether it is intended more as a "marker" to indicate the unhappiness of the United States with current dispute settlement practice and to lay the groundwork for a tough overall negotiating posture.
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In a subsequent submission to the WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, USTR identified a number of specific issues for negotiation. Two of these issues had been the subject of Appellate Body decisions, including the zeroing issue in EC-Bed Linen. USTR suggested, though it did not say outright, that the decision had wrongly imposed a new obligation on member states. It stated that, "[i]f there are to be any WTO obligations regarding such calculations, they should be the result of an agreement by the Members."
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Here the United States appears to be attempting to reverse the presumption that a negotiated rule would be necessary to change an Appellate Body interpretation, in favor of one that a negotiated rule would be necessary to validate the Appellate Body interpretation.
Other than confirm that the dispute settlement decisions have had an impact on subsequent trade negotiations, these early indications do not provide much empirical support for my hypothesized dynamic. Perhaps the United States will ultimately "pay" twice for a clarification of the applicable standard of review. Perhaps, instead, an 38 The ambiguity was maintained in a report to Congress on Executive Branch Strategy Regarding WTO Dispute Settlement Panels and the Appellate Body, Dec. 30, 2002: In particular the United States will use the Rules negotiations to promote the proper application of the standards of review and the recognition that dispute settlement panels and It is possible that the dispute settlement bodies have heeded the criticism of their previous decisions. If this pattern continues in future cases decided during the Doha Round of trade negotiations, the interesting question will be whether the more recent decisions moderate the skepticism of U.S. authorities towards trade law reviews, or whether the actions of the dispute settlement bodies are seen as strategic and thus temporary.
V. Conclusion
There is obviously far too little evidence available to determine how significant the theoretical harm to liberal trade from activist WTO dispute settlement will be in practice. 43 In each case the panel made explicit reference to the Article 17.6(ii) standard of review, in one instance indicating that if an interpretation is " 'permissible,' then we are compelled to accept it," ¶7.341, n. 223, and in the other simply referring to the standard of review, ¶7.361, n. 233.
It should, however, be clear that aggressive review of domestic trade remedy laws is not without costs for the cause of liberalized trade. An important concluding observation is that the dynamic hypothesized in this paper is driven by the perceptions and beliefs of relevant actors, a fact that itself raises some intriguing issues.
The hypothesized change in negotiating strategies occurs because national officials believe that the dispute settlement process has imposed greater "costs" than had been anticipated. But where does this belief originate? If it can be explained solely as the reaction of disgruntled domestic constituencies and their political champions after losing WTO dispute settlement cases, then this belief cannot drive the dynamic described in this paper. The unhappiness of import-sensitive constituencies is unlikely to vary enormously based on the stated reasons for their losses at the WTO. Moreover, the concerns of importsensitive industries at the prospect of further trade-liberalizing measures are more or less constant. Both these circumstances suggest that the political costs associated with dispute settlement outcomes are at root a function of the political position of these constituencies.
They will exert whatever influence they can to protect themselves from further import competition. The relative activism or self-restraint of WTO dispute settlement bodies would have little impact on the process.
If the specific practices of the Appellate Body and panels do have an effect, it must arise from the perceptions of those who are not predictable supporters of the importsensitive constituencies. For example, other constituencies and their political champions might conclude that the dispute settlement process is inappropriately activist. Thus each example of perceived hostility towards other trade remedy laws advances the case of those who oppose further anti-dumping negotiations. In addition, the evaluations of the dispute settlement process by supposedly disinterested parties assumes greater importance, since it may validate the contention of the import-sensitive industries that they are being denied the protections promised them as part of the political compromise that enabled an earlier round trade negotiations to proceed. Contrary to some popular and academic belief, there are legislators who try to understand and act on the merits and equities of public policy issues.
Thus academic debate itself becomes a potential factor influencing outcomes. This blurring of the line between research and data raises interesting questions concerning the potential for strategic behavior by academics themselves: Might, for example, an academic trade liberal reject conclusions of Appellate Body activism precisely because such a conclusion would be particularly useful to import-sensitive constituencies coming from an unexpected source?
The importance of perceptions also raises the issue of whether a more skillful drafting of opinions by panels and the Appellate Body might well have reached the same results without revealing so clearly the lack of weight given to Article 17.6. In that event, disinterested parties might be more cautious about concluding that the Appellate Body has disregarded a provision that favors the positions of national anti-dumping authorities.
Because the WTO dispute settlement bodies took what was, in some sense, the more honest route of clearly ignoring the special standard of review, their hostility towards traderestricting dumping measures is now manifest. The risk is that the road paved with good intentions may lead not to more liberal trade but to fewer liberalizing steps or, in the worst case, to negotiating paralysis.
